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Suruchi Jaiswal

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Whoever imposes severe punishment becomes repulsive to people while he who awards mild punishment becomes contemptible. The Ruler just with the rod is honoured. When deserved punishment is given, it endows the subject with spiritual good, material well-being and pleasures of senses.”

                                                                                                                                     -Kautilya

INTRODUCTION

Economic offence is a distinct type of criminal offence. Economic crimes not only cause financial hardship for individuals, but they can also have major consequences for the overall economy. Economic crimes such as forgery, currency counterfeiting, financial scams, fraud, money laundering, and so on are important concerns that have an impact on the nation’s security and governance. Thus, the punishment in cases of such offences should not be so lenient that it does not have an adequate deterrent effect on the society at large. It is, therefore, the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance between the nature of the crime and loss caused to the public exchequer and the sentence awarded, as awarding a lesser sentence encourages any criminal and, as a result of the same, the society suffers.

This Article aims to provide an overview of economic crimes in India, as well as legislative efforts to address them, with a focus on the sentencing policy used by Indian Courts. The Article is divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of economic offences. The second section deals with the types of economic offences and relevant legislations addressing these offences. The third section delves into the jurisprudence of sentencing and the fourth section focuses on the sentencing policy adopted by the Courts in cases of economic offences.

I. ECONOMIC OFFENCES: OVERVIEW

Economic offences are often referred to as White/Blue Collar crimes. Usually people of influence or people who come from wealthy backgrounds are found involved in such crimes with the help of some unscrupulous and corrupt government functionaries and advanced technology.

Although in some parts of the world, like the United States, the term “economic offence” has been defined, a rigorous definition of the same is still lacking in India.

The Law Commission in its 47th Report has attempted to define economic offences as under [http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/report47.pdf]:-

““Economic offences” are those that affect the country’s economy, and not merely the wealth of an individual victim. In this category fall white collar crimes i.e. crimes committed in the course of their occupation by members of the upper class of society, offences calculated to prevent or obstruct the economic development of the country and endanger its economic health, evasion of taxes, misuse of position by public servants, offences in the nature of breaches of contracts resulting in the delivery of goods not according to specifications, hoarding and black marketing, adulteration of food and drugs, theft and misappropriation of public property and funds, and trafficking in the licences, permits etc.”

Considerations that often distinguish economic offences from other types of crime are summarised as follows:

    1. The motive of the criminal is avarice or rapaciousness (not lust or hate).
    2. Background of the crime is non-emotional (unlike murder, rape, defamation etc.). There is no emotional reaction as between the victim and the offender.
    3. The victim is usually the State or a section of the public, particularly the consuming public (i.e. that portion which consumes goods or services, buys shares or securities or other intangibles). Even where there is an individual victim, the more important element of the offence is harm to the society.
    4. Mode of operation of the offender is fraud, not force.
    5. Usually, the act is deliberate and wilful.
    6. Interest aimed to be protected through criminal legislations against these offences is two-fold-
      A. Societal interest in the preservation of-
      (i)  the property or wealth or health of its individual members, and national resources, and
      (ii) the general economic system as a whole, from exploitation, or waste by individuals or groups;
      B. Social interest in the augmentation of the wealth of the country by enforcing the laws relating to
      taxes and duties, foreign exchange, foreign commerce, industries and the like.

These unique features of economic offences have resulted in a fluid and unsettled jurisprudence in the sentencing of such offenders.

II. LAWS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC OFFENCES IN INDIA AND THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED THEREIN

Several laws dealing with economic offences were established to punish offenders. Furthermore, these Acts were legislated to preserve the normal operations of commerce, contracts, and so on, and to allow them to take place with or without the least amount of malpractices.

But, have these legislations been remarkable in dealing expressly with this criminological subset? More so, are the punishments provided under these legislations proportionate to the damage and danger caused by these offences?

Before delving into the issue of proportionality, we need to examine the quantum of punishment prescribed under these special statues.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Section Description Title Minimum Punishment Maximum Punishment

7

Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act. Three years Seven years + Fine.

8

Taking gratification, in order, by corrupt or illegal means, to influence public servant. Three years Seven years +
Fine.

9

Taking gratification, for exercise of personal influence with public servant. Three years Seven years + Fine.

10

Punishment for abetment by public servant of offences defined in section 8 or 9. Six months Five years + Fine.

11

Public servant obtaining valuable thing, without consideration from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant. Six months Five years + Fine.

12

Punishment for abetment of offences defined in section 7 or 11. Three years Seven years + Fine.

13

Criminal misconduct by a public servant. Four years Ten years + Fine.

14

Habitual committing of offence under sections 8, 9 and 12. Five years Ten years + Fine.

15

Punishment for attempt. Two years Five years + Fine.

Prevention Of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Section Description Title Minimum Punishment Maximum Punishment

4

Punishment for money-laundering Three years Seven years + Fine up to Rs. 5 Lakhs.

(Ten Years in case where the proceeds of crime involved relate to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule.)

 Economic Offences Under Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section Description Title Minimum Punishment Maximum Punishment
406 Punishment for criminal breach of trust Three years + Fine
408 Criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant Seven years + Fine
409 Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent. Imprisonment for life or Seven years + Fine.
420 Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Seven years + Fine.
466 Forgery of record or Court or of public register etc. Seven years + Fine.
467 Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. Imprisonment for life or Ten years + Fine.
468 Forgery for purpose of cheating Seven years + Fine.
471 Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record. Shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record.
477A Falsification of accounts. Seven years or Fine or both.
120B Punishment for Criminal Conspiracy. Six months or Fine or both.

An analysis of the above tabular representation depicts that the maximum punishment provided for most of these offences is ‘seven to ten years.’ Only in respect to few offences, illustratively, offences under the Indian Penal Code, i.e., Forgery for valuable security, will etc. [Section 467] or Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent [Section 409, IPC], the maximum punishment prescribed is imprisonment for life.

The problem that persists with these legislations is that the maximum punishment which are prescribed for such offences is not punitive enough to deal with the situation effectively. In fact, the maximum punishment should reflect that there is widespread social disapproval of these types of offences, but unfortunately, that cannot be seen on examining the sentencing provisions of these legislations which have been legislated to curb such economic offences.

Furthermore, the present trend of legislation as also the judicial approach to such offences appears to be that these offences are treated lightly and the punishment is neither adequate nor proportionate to the gravity of the offence.

For example, if someone were to break into your house and steal 5 lakhs, it is less of a penalty than if someone accosts you in the street at gunpoint and takes 5 lakhs , because they have put you in fear and we value our right to be free of fear. So, we have a higher penalty for robbery than we do for burglary.

However, the said principle becomes inapplicable when it comes to economic crimes wherein the offenders cause grave harm, not only to the victim who has directly suffered, but to the overall economy of the country. These offenders are allowed to play around and perform their financial shenanigans at the cost of the law abiding citizens who are the ultimate victims of such crimes. The punishment that is prescribed for such offences is far less as compared to the actual loss and harm that is caused. Given the stakes, it is surprising that even though the impact of white collar criminals is much worse than that of traditional criminals, however, the “white collar” helps the offender stay clear of the “blacks” of long imprisonment periods.

Recently, Mr. Lalu Prasad, the former Chief Minister of Bihar, yet again made headlines for the fifth episode in the series of his infamous “Fodder Scams”. A special CBI Court in Ranchi sentenced him to five years imprisonments for the illegal withdrawal and misappropriation of Rs. 139.5 crores from Doranda Treasury. That’s correct – five years’ imprisonment for Rs. 139.5 crores scam! This is where the punishment part raises questions – whether a five-year sentence is sufficient to deter economic scams (going by the deterrence theory) and whether five-year sentence is proportional to the gravity of offence (going by the theory of proportionality). Clearly, the answer to both the above mentioned propositions would be a loud “no”. When the prescribed punishment fails the basic theories of punishment, the idea of punishment gets blurry. The aim and purpose of the punishment and the quantum thereof will lose its importance and resultantly, such offences will continue to rise.

When lead scams like Fodder scam, 2G scam, PNB scam, etc. have a maximum punishment which is same as some minor scams involving comparatively minute amounts, it cripples the basic foundation of the idea of punishment and justice. Severity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong. But clearly, the maximum punishments provided under the statutes mentioned above, do not meet the threshold of proportionality principle.

In the case titled, AP Suryakrasam vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (W.P [MD] No. 14481 of 2020), the Bench of Justices N. Kirubakaran and B. Pugalendhi of Madras High Court orally suggested that the country needs stringent penalties to curb the menace of corruption in the country. The Bench, in its order, observed:

“The Central Government may consider imposing punishment, such as, “hanging” or “death penalty”, for corrupt practices or for demanding and accepting bribes, like in China, North Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Morocco.”

The Bench further observed:

“People are compelled to accept corruption as normal one. Corruption has become deep rooted and has spread like Cancer. Every day, it is reported in the media that many officials are caught red handed, while taking bribes. Hence, the punishment needs to be enhanced.”

Therefore, there is an urgent need to enhance the maximum punishment for such offences so that these cases are properly and effectively dealt with and the offenders are adequately punished thereby leading to an adequate deterring effect on the society at large.

III. JURISPRUDENCE OF SENTENCING IN INDIA

Coming to the sentencing policy of the Indian legal system, it is seen that there are no overarching (and few settled) principles governing the sentencing of the economic offender. To the extent that there is general convergence in the approach to sentencing economic offenders, the approach is often not sound.

For instance, in deciding on the question of sentence the judge is expected to take into consideration, all relevant facts and circumstances of the case. All care should be taken to ensure that sentence imposed is in proportion to the nature and gravity of the time.

In the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee vs. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment has held in para 15 as under:

“…Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Courts respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime.”

A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254, observed as follows:

“99. … The object of awarding appropriate sentence should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result wise counterproductive in the long run and against the interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.

      1. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which both the criminal and the victim belong.”

After extensively referring to the objects of punishment in State of Punjab vs. Bawa Singh, (2015) 3 SCC 441, the Court held that

“16. …undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence….”

Further, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sanjay Kumar, (2012) 6 SCC 107, the Supreme Court highlighted the general principles of sentencing. The relevant portion of this judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

Sentencing policy is a way to guide judicial discretion in accomplishing particular sentencing. Generally, two criteria, that is, the seriousness of the crime and the criminal history of the accused, are used to prescribe punishment. By introducing more uniformity and consistency into the sentencing process, the objective of the policy, is to make it easier to predict sentencing outcomes. Sentencing policies are needed to address concerns in relation to unfettered judicial discretion and lack of uniform and equal treatment of similarly situated convicts. The principle of proportionality, as followed in various judgments of this Court, prescribes that, the punishments should reflect the gravity of the offence and also the criminal background of the convict. Thus, the graver the offence and the longer the criminal record, the more severe is the punishment to be awarded.”

In view of the above it can be inferred/deducted that the Court has to make a balance between 2 different principles i.e. the “aggravating circumstances” and the “mitigating circumstances”.

Following are some of the extenuating/mitigating and aggravating circumstances:

Extenuating/mitigating circumstances:

      • antecedents of offender;
      • nature of the offence;
      • circumstances of the offence;
      • prior criminal record of the offender;
      • age-tender or old;
      • background with reference to education, home life, sobriety, social background and economic condition;
      • emotional and mental condition;
      • prospect of rehabilitation;
      • provocation-sudden fight;
      • absence of mens rea;
      • influence or instigation of some other person;
      • self-preservation;
      • exceeding self defense;
      • state of health;
      • delay in disposal of case;
      • drunkenness.

Aggravating circumstances:

      • gravity of offence;
      • deliberate and well planned crime;
      • habitual offender;
      • causing hurt for extortion;
      • securing aid of accomplices;
      • breach of trust and misappropriation especially public money;
      • perjury and fabricating false evidence (Sec.193);
      • offence perpetrated by fraudulent means;
      • socio-economic offences with planned profit making;
      • menace to public health, eg. Adulteration of food articles;
      • degradation of conduct, eg. Infanticide, daring assault on women;
      • personal gain at the expense of innocent;

Proportionality and Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances:

The Courts in gauging the seriousness of an offence, have permitted a wide range of variables other than the harm caused and the offender’s culpability. However, there are several problems with allowing factors not directly related to the offence to have a role in evaluating offence seriousness.

Firstly, many of the sentencing variables which are currently regarded as key considerations in the sentencing calculus, such as the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and the need for specific deterrence are, in fact, misguided.

Secondly, it is contradictory to claim that the principle of proportionality means the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and then allow considerations external to the offence to have a role in determining how much punishment is appropriate.

Finally, by allowing such considerations a look in, much of the splendour of the principle of proportionality dissipates.  Should the Courts when elaborating on the matters that are relevant in gauging the seriousness of the offence, give much adherence to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances?

The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that special facts of each case warrants. Judges in essences affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice, sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic result of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from ‘just deserts’ as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.

Giving the offender a lighter sentence would make the country’s justice system questionable. The common man will lose faith in the judicial system. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon.

Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could no longer endure under such serious threats. It is , therefore, the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., AIR 1991 SC 1463.

IV. APPROACH ADOPTED BY THE COURTS IN SETENCING ECONOMIC OFFENDERS

Economic offences are generally regarded as being committed principally for greed. Thus, the paramount consideration in sentencing should be the amount of money involved. Other important considerations are the level of sophistication and planning of the offence and whether or not a breach of trust occurred.

According to Bentham the seriousness of crime should be measured by their respective social harm rather than by the sinfulness of the other transcendental qualities and when crimes are caused by rational efforts of man to augment their pleasure, as the case with economic crimes, those deserve to be punished strictly and adequately so that the retributive and deterrent purpose of punishment is properly secured.

The cardinal role of general deterrence in relation to such crimes has been confirmed by numerous authorities. For example in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Anr.,(1987) 2 SCC 364, the Supreme Court, observed as under:-

“The entire Community is aggrieved if the socio-economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to books. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A disregard for the interest of the Community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the Community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest.”

In Prem Kumar Parmar v. State, 1989 RLR 131, the Court observed that such offences are even worse than murders. It was observed

The economic offences having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds whether of nationalized banks or of the State and its instrumentalities need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of our country. Therefore, the persons involved in such offences, particularly those who continue to reap the benefit of the crime committed by them, do not deserve any indulgence and any sympathy to them would not only be entirely misplaced but also against the larger interest of the society. The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that such offences are preceded by cool, calculated and deliberate design, with an eye on personal gains, and in fact, not all such offences come to the surface. If a person knows that even after misappropriating huge public funds, he can come out on bail after spending a few months in jail, and thereafter, he can continue to enjoy the ill-gotten wealth, obtained by illegal means, that would only encourage many others to commit similar crimes in the belief that even if they have to spend a few months in jail, they can lead a lavish and comfortable life thereafter, utilizing the public funds acquired by them.”

In Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Jagjit Singh, (2013) 10 SCC 686, the Supreme Court observed that such offences are great social wrongs and they have immense societal impact, the ultimate victim being the society as collective. It was said such offences not only creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society and but also creates a deep dent in the economic spine of the nation.

In Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot vs. State Of Maharashtra, (1978) 2 SCC (Cri) 469, full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court had severely castigated the lenient view taken by the Sessions Court in sentencing a convict in offences and observed as under:

“The soft justice syndrome vis-a-vis white collar offenders scandalizes the Court. It stultifies social justice and camouflages needed severity with naive leniency”.

“7. Social defence is the criminological foundation of punishment. The trial judge has confused between correctional approach to prison treatment and nominal punishment verging on decriminalisation of serious social offences. The first is basic and the second pathetic. That Court which ignores the grave injury to society implicit in economic crimes by the upperberth ‘mafia’ ill serves social justice. Soft sentencing justice is gross injustice where many innocents are the potential victims. It is altogether a different thing to insist on therapeutic treatment, hospital setting and correctional goals inside the prison (even punctuated by parole, opportunities for welfare work meditational normalisation and healthy self-expression) so that the convict may be humanised and, on release, rehabilitated as a safe citizen. This Court has explained the correctional strategy of punishment in Giasuddin’s Case (1978) 1 SCR 153 : (AIR 1977 SC 1926). Coddling is not correctional any more than torture is deterrent. While iatrogenic prison terms are bad because they dehumanize, it is functional failure and judicial pathology to hold out a benignly self-defeating non-sentence to deviants who endanger the morals and morale, the health and wealth of society.

CONCLUSION

The imposition of penalty levels that are proportionate to the severity of the offence, and are not corrupted by considerations related to other (misguided) penal objectives, would lead to significant improvements in the consistency and fairness of the sentencing process when punishing economic offences.

Unless the Courts award appropriately deterrent punishment taking note of the nature of the offence and the status of the offenders involved at the relevant time, people will lose faith in the justice delivery system and the very object of the special legislation on prevention of these crimes will be defeated. As of now, the appropriate sessions/special courts do not have the discretion to impose sentence more than 7 – 10 years in cases where the public exchequer has lost millions of rupees. This is because the legislations in their present form have simply capped the maximum limit to around 7 – 10 years.

The Court is the statute’s conscience, its decisions must reflect and promote the policy goals of punishment, lest the public’s faith in the Courts is shaken. The common citizen will not be surprised by the sentence decision. It should represent the general public’s disgust with the crime. As a result, the Court has a responsibility to safeguard and promote the public interest while also fostering public faith in the rule of law’s efficacy. Misplaced sympathy or unwarranted leniency will send a wrong signal to the public giving room to suspect the institutional integrity, affecting the credibility of its verdict.

The Parliament of country may need to revisit the existing legislations surrounding this framework and if required make suitable amendments. Best practises from around the World needs to be carefully studied on the basis of which some of these amendments can be made. In part II of this article, we shall be discussing and quoting from some of the best practises across the globe thereby highlighting the sentencing guidelines/provisions applicable against economic offences in those respective jurisdictions.

“What makes the joint action of a group of ‘n’ persons more fearsome than the individual actions of those ‘n’ persons is the division of labour and the mutual psychological support that collaboration affords.”

 -Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law

Conspiracy is an ‘inchoate’ offence. It is an independent offence and can be charged even if the intended offence is not committed or attempted. If two people, for example, plan the joint robbery of a store, they can be liable for conspiracy despite not carrying out the robbery. While the substantive crime is robbery, the conspiracy to commit robbery is inchoate as it has not been accomplished.

In India, conspiracy was initially considered as only a civil wrong, but later on it was brought under the ambit of Indian Criminal Law. Conspiracy was not an offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) until the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1913 was passed which incorporated, Sections 120A and 120B in the IPC.

Section 120A IPC as contained in Chapter V-A defines the offence of criminal conspiracy. It states that when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act, or, an act, which is legal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated as “criminal conspiracy”. It then provides an exception to the effect that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is committed by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. The explanation appended to the Section clarifies that it is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement or is merely incidental to that object.

Section 120-B, IPC provides punishment for committing the offence of criminal conspiracy. It provides that whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards shall be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence provided there is no express provision made in the Code for punishment of such conspiracy. Sub-section (2) of Section 120-B, IPC, however, provides that a person who is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with an imprisonment of either for a term not exceeding six months or with fine or both.

Reading of Section 120-A and Section 120-B, IPC conjointly elucidates that an offence of “criminal conspiracy” is a separate and distinct offence. Therefore, in order to constitute a criminal conspiracy and to attract its rigour, two factors must be present in the case on facts:

Firstly, an agreement between two or more persons, and

Secondly, agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is legal in itself but is done by illegal means.

However, if the agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence, it does not amount to criminal conspiracy unless it is followed up by an overt act done by one or more persons in furtherance of such agreement. The offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators to do that illegal act, or legal act by illegal means. It is undoubted that the general conspiracy is distinct from number of separate offences committed while executing the offence of conspiracy. Each act constitutes separate offence punishable, independent of the conspiracy.

“A conspiracy is seldom born of ‘open covenants openly arrived at.” It may therefore be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. Keeping that in mind, the Courts in India have given the prosecution a broad discretion in offering its case.

For an offence under Section 120B, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. The offence can be only proved largely from the inference drawn from acts or illegal omissions committed by the conspirators in pursuance of a common design. The prosecution will also more often rely upon circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary to prove actual meeting of conspirators. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design is sufficient. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct of accused persons constitute relevant material to prove charge of conspiracy [See Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1980 SC 439; Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1062; and Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883].

In Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 6 SCALE 469], the Hon’ble Apex Court held that:

“The existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. But the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events from which a conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn. It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence and renders the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable even if an offence does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement.”

In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P [1953 CRI.L.J. 129], the Apex Court has held that while appreciating the circumstantial evidence the following needs to be ascertained by the Court:

(1) whether the circumstances are fully established;

(2) the circumstances should be conclusive in nature and it should exclude every other hypothesis than the hypothesis which is to be proved; and

(3) the chain of circumstances should be so complete that it does not leave reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with innocence of the accused.

Thus, an agreement may be shown by wholly circumstantial evidence, and the individual’s intent to join the agreement can be demonstrated by “circumstances altogether inconclusive which may, by their number and joint operation be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof.”

The traditional view of conspiracy law has always been that the added group danger justifying this crime was based upon an agreement linking two or more willing criminal partners together. In many situations, however, only one party may be a willing participant while the other is simply one who feigns agreement. In such a situation, the question arises as to whether only the “true” conspirator should be guilty for the offence of conspiracy.

To address the said question, Section 10 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 may be examined, which states that:

“Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.”

In other words, anything said/done/written by a conspirator related to the “common intention” of all conspirators, after such ‘intention’ (to commit the conspiracy) was first entertained by them, is a relevant fact against each of the co-conspirators. This principle is based on to the ‘principle of agency’ where each conspirator is held liable for anything said/done/or written by his fellow co-conspirators in furtherance of their common intention to commit the conspiracy.

Section 120B and conviction of a single accused: “A person cannot conspire with himself

As per the definition of Criminal Conspiracy as provided in Section 120-A of IPC, one person cannot be held guilty for criminal conspiracy and there must exist an involvement of at least two or more person.

The said principle was laid down in the landmark case of Topan Das v. State of Bombay, [AIR 1956 SC 33], wherein it was held that under section 120B IPC for criminal conspiracy when all except one of the accused are acquitted, conviction of remaining accused is illegal. Herein, the Appellant along with the other three named accused (acquitted) were charged under section 120B read with sections 471 and 420, IPC, 1860 for conspiring to use forged documents and thereby induced the Controller of Imports to grant import licenses. The magistrate acquitted all the accused. But the High Court, on State appeal, reversed the order of acquittal of the appellant and convicted him for the substantive offence as well as conspiracy to commit such offences under section 120B, IPC but maintained acquittal of others. The Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that, the Appellant could not be convicted of the offence under section 120B, IPC when his alleged co-conspirators were acquitted of the offence. When all the accused, except one, are acquitted of the charge, the remaining one cannot be convicted, unless the charge against him has been that he conspired to commit an offence not only with the acquitted co-accused but also with some other persons who have not been tried because the offender happens to be absconding or is insane or is a minor below seven years of age, or because of any other reason and such a charge is proved. The appeal was allowed and the conviction was set aside.

In Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa [MANU/SC/0024/1956], the Court distinguished the case from Topandas (supra) and other similar rulings observing that in those cases the only persons alleged to have been guilty of the offence of criminal conspiracy were the persons placed on trial. However, in the instant case, besides the other accused persons who were acquitted, there was one Approver who led the evidence for establishing the case u/s 120B against the Appellant. Thus, despite the acquittal of the other accused persons, the Appellant’s conviction was not set aside.

In Vinayak v. State of Maharashtra [MANU/SC/0136/1984], argument on lines of Bimbadhar (supra) judgment was not raised by the State and hence Topandas was followed.

In Brathi v. State of Punjab [MANU/SC/0071/1991], the Court discussed the principles governing conviction of a single accused in cases concerning offences under section 34, 149 and 120-B of the IPC. The Court reiterated that the essence of these offences is not in conviction of a requisite number of persons, but in proof of fact beyond reasonable doubt that the requisite number of persons were involved.

Hence, for setting aside a conviction under section 120-B on the ground that all other co-accused persons have been acquitted, it needs to be shown that the offence of conspiracy was not committed by the Appellant/Petitioner/accused before the Court, in agreement with others like Approver, unknown accused/suspects, etc. Once it is shown that the charge of conspiracy against such accused is based on the same evidences as the other co-accused who have been acquitted and that the facts do not disclose commission of conspiracy (with others), the conviction under section 120-B is liable to be set aside as a person cannot conspire with himself.

Participation and Punishment: Acts/Omissions of the Co-conspirators

Coming to the principle of agency in criminal conspiracy, it is well established that the co-conspirators can be punished for the actions/omissions of one or more of them despite the fact that the said act/omission was not committed by all of them personally. In the State of H.P. v. Krishna Lal Pradhan [1987 AIR (SC) 773], it was observed that if pursuant to the criminal conspiracy the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences, even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offences. It can be understood that principle of agency as introduced by Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it evident that the act done by one conspirator is admissible against the co-conspirators.

In Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI [(2003) 3 SCC 641], while dealing with the conspiracy the majority opinion laid down that:

“The encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. Thus, the conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design.”

Further in the case of State v. Nalini [1999 (5) SCC 253], Hon’ble Justice S.S.M. Quardri, after a survey of existing case laws, made the following pertinent observation:

“It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission of those offences.”

Let us understand this principle through an illustration. Let’s assume that a criminal conspiracy was hatched between A, B and C to eliminate X and to give effect to the plan, B employed D a contract killer to execute the murder of X. Pursuant to the above plan, A, B and C drove D to X’s house where D caused the murder of X by shooting him at point blank range. Even though A, B and C have not committed the overt act of murder the following charges would be framed against:

A – 1st Charge under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC

B – 1st Charge under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC

C – 1st Charge under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC

D –  1st Charge under Section 302 + 2nd Charge under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC

In a scenario if the murder does not occur, they may still be guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and be charged under Section 120B, IPC as conspiracy in itself is a substantive offence, if the evidence shows that they deliberated and committed an overt act in furtherance of their agreement.  Herein the charges will be framed as under:

A – 1st Charge under Section 307 read with Section 120B of IPC

B – 1st Charge under Section 307 read with Section 120B of IPC

C – 1st Charge under Section 307 read with Section 120B of IPC

D –  1st Charge under Section 307 + 2nd Charge under Section 307 read with Section 120B of IPC

Conversely, if their attempt was a spur-of-the-moment decision and not a product of prior deliberation, and if X survives the assault, they would be guilty of attempted murder but not conspiracy to commit murder. If their attempt succeeds in the latter scenario, they would be guilty of murder and charged under Section 302, IPC alone.

According to the Principle of agency, pursuant to the criminal conspiracy if the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offences. The essence of this principle is that it deters crime by increasing penalties for those who join conspiracies. If potential criminals have adequate advance knowledge of the penal provisions, they assume the risk that they will be held criminally liable for the actions of their co-conspirators, even when those actions fall outside the scope of the criminal agreement. Thus, this extended liability serves a cautionary role meant to deter criminal behaviour.

Advocate Puja Jakhar and Advocate Suruchi Jaiswal are Junior Counsels at BlackRobe Chambers.

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